Pakistan and India

With President Obama’s Marjah Offensive in full swing in Afghanistan, representatives from Pakistan and India officially talked recently for the first time since the Mumbai terrorist attack in November of 2008. While the talks yielded little substantively between the two nuclear-armed enemies, they are a timely reminder of the fact that the future of America’s goals in Afghanistan is dependent on Pakistan and India.

At the talks, India expressed concerns that Pakistan has yet to arrest Hafiz Saeed, founder of Laskhar e-Taiba, the organization accused of carrying out the Mumbai attacks.

Anger in India has only increased since the New Delhi talks, when suicide bombers in Kabul caused the deaths of at least six Indians, fueling suspicion that Pakistan was behind the bombing in order to try to get India to stay out Afghanistan. S.M. Krishna, India's foreign minister said, "These are the handiwork of those who are desperate to undermine the friendship between India and Afghanistan, and do not wish to see a strong, democratic and pluralistic Afghanistan."

Pakistan, on the other hand, tried to keep the focus of the talks away from terrorism. Mr. Salman Bashir, Pakistan’s foreign secretary, said it was “unfair, unrealistic and counterproductive” for India to try to concentrate entirely on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts.

Pakistan’s government is under constant threat internally from extremist elements, and relies heavily on American military support to stay in power. Domestically, it is a political tight rope that Islamabad must walk, especially given the dramatic upswing in U.S. drone attacks within Pakistan since President Obama took office. Yet Pakistan must never appear soft on terror on the world stage, as that is the nexus for Pakistan-U.S. relations.

To Islamabad’s chagrin, New Delhi wanted to mostly discuss concerns about terrorism. India’s foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, accused Islamabad of not going “far enough to unravel the full conspiracy behind the Mumbai attack.” Mr. Bashir responded defensively while recognizing the validity, and tried to refocus the talks on Kashmir and Indian dam projects that Pakistan says results in the theft of Pakistani water.

While the talks in New Delhi were not particularly productive, they did once again open up dialogue and future contact between the rivals. How this relationship plays out in the future could prove vital to U.S. interests in Afghanistan.

Because the Afghan-Pakistan border is so porous and tribal in nature, international and local extremists alike have been able to work in both countries for quite some time. This is a main reason why America has worked closely with Pakistan in its Afghan endeavors since 2001.

There have long been extremist elements in Pakistan’s security and intelligence forces, but at the top of most Pakistani’s priorities list is Kashmir and India. This is has led Islamabad to ally itself closely with Washington in its fight against terror in South Asian, in the hopes that it would gain a powerful ally in maneuvering against India.

Not to be outplayed, New Delhi has also pledged large amounts of money and help to Afghanistan. The problem for Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, has become political attacks that he is the puppet of U.S. interests. Mr. Singh has reaffirmed his commitment to Afghanistan since the Kabul bombings, but was careful to add that in regards to the New Delhi talks, President Obama “not once has sought to pressurize India into taking one position or the other.”

Ultimately, Afghanistan cannot be controlled by military might. Whether the Marjah Offensive is effective or not in the short term, Afghanistan must be able to both stabilize internally and fit into the context of the region. Both levels will be contingent upon Pakistan and India.

If President Obama would like to gracefully leave Afghanistan during his presidency, he must find a way to navigate this rivalry to his advantage. Islamabad and New Delhi will not cease to be competitive anytime this generation, so an easing of tensions would likely be in Washington’s best interest.

If diplomatic channels can be used to create a situation where Pakistan and India have long term aligning interests in the stability of Afghanistan, that would be a far bigger victory than anything the military could hope for during the Marjah Offensive.